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We study indirect democracy in which countries, states, or districts
each elect a representative who later votes at a union level on their
behalf. We show that the voting rule that maximizes the total expected
utility of all agents in the union involves assigning a weight to each
district’s vote and then sticking with the status quo unless at least a
threshold of weighted votes is cast for change. We analyze how the
weights relate to the population size of a country and the correlation
structure of agents’ preferences, and then we compare the voting
weights in the Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty
and the recently proposed Constitution.
I. Introduction
Citizens vote occasionally, whereas their elected representatives vote fre-
quently. This is sensible because of the burden of becoming informed
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on a myriad of issues and the cost of involving full populations in all
the decisions that direct democracy would require. While indirect de-
mocracy is sensible and prevalent, it introduces distortions in the de-
cision process because a single vote by a representative does not com-
pletely represent the heterogeneity of votes that would be cast by that
representative’s constituency.
If districts are small, of similar size, and of similar degrees of heter-
ogeneity, then weighting each representative’s vote equally provides a
system of indirect democracy that maximizes overall societal welfare.
However, for a variety of reasons, there are many systems of indirect
democracy that are not structured in this way. A particularly important
and timely example is the Council of Ministers of the European Union,
a critical decision-making body of the European Union. That council
consists of a single representative from each country in the European
Union. The countries differ widely in their population sizes and com-
positions. Similar examples include the United Nations, the U.S. Senate,
and a variety of state and local governments. In any democratic union
in which the districts are of different sizes and compositions, it makes
sense to weight the votes of the representatives.1 For instance, if districts
differ in population and votes are not weighted, then small districts
could impose decisions that a majority of citizens oppose.
In this paper, we take as given that a heterogeneous set of countries,
states, or districts each have one representative who votes on their behalf
over collective decisions. We characterize the voting rule that maximizes
total societal welfare, as measured by the sum of the utilities of all citizens
of the union, subject to the constraint that the district structure is fixed
exogenously and is possibly heterogeneous. We examine votes over two
alternatives: a status quo and change. We show that an optimal voting
rule consists of a weight for each country’s vote and a threshold, in-
dicating how large the total weight of votes cast in favor of change must
be in order for change to be enacted.
One important conclusion of our analysis is that the optimal voting
weights and thresholds can be derived separately. The optimal weight
of a country’s vote depends on the size of the population and the
distribution of preferences within a country relative to other countries.
The threshold depends on the bias of preferences in terms of the in-
tensity in favor of the status quo compared to change.
The efficient weights can be described intuitively as follows. Consider
the vote by a given representative of a country. Suppose that he or she
has voted yes on a given issue. We can then ask the following question:
Given the vote of yes, what is the surplus of people in the country who
1 Alternatively, one can think of adjusting the number of representatives that each
country, state, or district has.
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favor yes over no? For instance, if 62 percent of the people favor yes
and 38 percent favor no, then 24 percent more of the population favor
yes versus no. Multiplying this percentage times the population gives us
a measure of how much this country would benefit if we chose yes versus
no and how much this country would suffer if we chose the reverse.
The efficient voting weight is exactly this expected surplus.2
As the general characterization of efficient voting rules depends on
the distribution of preferences within each country, we also explore a
model that we refer to as the “block model,” which allows us to derive
optimal weights as a function of population size. This works by assuming
that a country’s population can be partitioned into blocks: citizens
within a block have perfectly correlated preferences, whereas citizens
across blocks have independent preferences. This structure allows us to
pinpoint the efficient voting weights and thresholds under two focal
scenarios.
We also examine the model’s implications for the voting system of
the Council of Ministers of the European Union. The Nice Treaty of
2000 and the Constitutional Convention of 2003 proposed different sets
of weights and different voting thresholds. Under the Nice Treaty,
weights are less than proportional to population size and the threshold
is relatively high (73.9 percent). The Constitutional Convention pro-
posed weights that are directly proportional to population size and a
lower threshold (65 percent).3 We show that these two conflicting pro-
posals coincide with the optimal weights under two polar cases of our
“block model.” Which weights are more efficient then boils down to an
empirical question of preference patterns.
Contribution and relation to the literature.—It is surprising that the pre-
vious literature has not considered the criterion of efficiency (total ex-
pected utility) as a guide to determine optimal voting rules for indirect
democracy.4 The literature on indirect democracy approaches the prob-
lem from other perspectives. For instance, there is a rich literature in
2 Our model allows for heterogeneities in intensities of preferences among voters as
well, and the weights adjust for that. Here we are simply describing a special case in which
intensity among voters is similar. The full characterization is provided below.
3 The convention’s proposal also includes a requirement that 55 percent of the countries
support a measure (Constitution, Title IV, Article I-25), which could also be binding, but
less frequently; and that a blocking minority include at least four countries. (There are
also special provisions for votes on issues that were not proposed through either the
commission or the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, where the requirement on countries
is raised to 72 percent.) As a first (rough) approximation, we ignore these extra constraints
in the discussion of the Constitution’s proposed weights. As we shall see in the discussion
following theorem 1, more complex voting systems can be optimal (see also Harstad [2005]
for a rationalization of dual majority systems).
4 Rae (1969) analyzed voting rules under this utilitarian perspective of maximizing ex-
pected utility or satisfaction rather than decisiveness (see also Badger 1972; Curtis 1972),
but in the context of direct democracy.
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cooperative game theory on weighted majority games. A main thread
there has been to produce power indices, such as the Shapley-Shubik
(1954) and Banzhaf (1965) indices, which measure things such as the
relative probabilities that different voters are pivotal. While some re-
searchers have built power measures based on satisfaction (i.e., total
utility) and contrasted them with power measures built on decisiveness
(see, e.g., Dubey and Shapley 1979; Barry 1980; Laruelle and Valenciano
2003), our perspective is still quite different. Our aim is not to measure
power or satisfaction or to compare rules under such measures, but
instead to study the optimal design of voting rules. To the extent that
the previous literature has thought about designing rules, it has focused
on equating the power of agents rather than maximizing the total ex-
pected utilities of agents.5 This dates to the seminal work of Penrose
(1946). These two objectives can lead to quite different voting rules,
and, as we show, maximizing total expected utility can result in large
inequalities in the treatment of individuals across countries.
Perhaps the closest predecessor to the theoretical part of our work
is the article by Felsenthal and Machover (1999), who also study the
design of two-stage voting rules from an optimization perspective. Their
objective is to minimize the expected difference between the size of the
majority and the number of supporters of the chosen alternative.6 That
objective differs from maximizing total expected utility since it does not
account for the surplus of voters in favor of an alternative when the
majoritarian alternative is selected, but accounts for the deficit only
when the majoritarian alternative is not selected.7
Finally, researchers have also examined the European Union’s deci-
sion making and brought ideas from weighted games to assess the rel-
ative power of different countries under the Nice Treaty (see, e.g., La-
ruelle [1998], Laruelle and Widgre´n [1998], Sutter [2000], Baldwin et
al. [2001], Bra¨uninger and Ko¨nig [2001], Galloway [2001], and Leech
[2002] and some of the references cited there). As the foundations of
our analysis of voting rules differ from the previous literature, so does
our analysis of the Nice Treaty and the new Constitution. Among other
things, we identify correlation structures of citizens’ preferences that
5 There are exceptions in the recent literature (e.g., Aghion and Bolton 2003; Barbera`
and Jackson 2004a; Harstad 2004; Casella 2005), but they approach the problem from
very different perspectives.
6 Felsenthal and Machover’s article includes an illuminating discussion of their objective
and some of the imprecisions in the previous literature.
7 While these two perspectives differ, they lead to the same weights in the particular
case of large countries of independently and identically distributed voters, where the
weights are proportional to the square root of a country’s population size (as originally
suggested by Penrose [1946] from an even different perspective). The setting with a large
number of independently and identically distributed voters is special and not so realistic—
especially for applications to, e.g., the European Union.
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would justify the various rules that have been proposed, something that
has not appeared previously.
Since writing this, we have become aware of independent work by
Bovens and Hartmann (2004), Feix et al. (2004), and Beisbart, Bovens,
and Hartmann (2005), who examine efficiency as an issue in the defi-
nition of a voting rule. However, the works are (completely) comple-
mentary.8
II. An Example
A simple example gives a preview of some of the issues that arise in
designing an efficient voting rule. The example shows why in some cases
it will be efficient to use weights that are not proportional to population.
Example 1. Nonproportional versus Proportional Weights
Consider a world with three countries. Countries 1 and 2 have pop-
ulations of one agent each. Country 3 has a population of three agents.
Each agent has an equal probability of supporting alternative a and
alternative b, and preferences are independent across agents. Agents
get a payoff of one if their preferred alternative is chosen and minus
one if the other alternative is chosen. Thus total utility can be deduced
by keeping track of the number of agents who support each alternative.
First, consider a situation in which countries are weighted in pro-
portion to their populations and use a threshold of 50 percent of the
total weight. That would result in weights of (1, 1, 3) and a threshold
of 2.5. This is equivalent to letting country 3 choose the alternative.
Note that it is possible for a minority of agents to prefer an alternative
and still have that be the outcome. For instance, if two agents in country
3 prefer a and all other agents prefer b, then a is still chosen.
The “efficient” weights—that is, those that maximize the total ex-
pected utility—are (1, 1, 1.5), and the efficient threshold is 1.75. In this
situation, the efficient voting rule is thus equivalent to one vote per
country. The proof that this is the efficient rule comes from our char-
acterization theorem below. However, to get a feeling for why it differs
from the straight proportional rule, let us compare the expected utilities.
Under the efficient rule it is also still possible for a minority of agents
to prefer a and a majority to prefer b but to still have a selected. For
instance, this happens if agents in countries 1 and 2 prefer a but all
8 Our characterization results, block models, and examination of the E.U. data differ
from their analyses. Bovens and Hartmann examine combinations of maximin and utili-
tarian (efficient) measures and examine when degressive proportionality is justified, and
Beisbart et al. provide a Pareto ranking of several variations on potential rules for the
E.U. Council of Ministers under various preference configurations. Feix et al. contrast two
models of voter preferences—impartial culture and impartial anonymous culture—and
show through simulations that they can lead to different optimal voting rules.
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agents in country 3 prefer b. Despite the fact that the efficient voting
rule is not always making the correct choice in terms of maximizing the
total utility, there is an important distinction between the efficient rule
and the proportional rule here. Fewer configurations of preferences
under the efficient voting rule lead to incorrect (minority-preferred)
decisions than under the proportional voting rule. This is seen as follows.
The configurations that are problematic in terms of agents’ prefer-
ences are as follows (where the first two entries indicate the preferences
of agents in the first two countries, and the last three entries correspond
to the agents in country 3): Alternative a can be the outcome and be
preferred only by a minority under the efficient voting rule only when
preferences are (a; a; b, b, b). However, under the proportional voting
rule there are three preference configurations that can lead to the
choice of a when a majority prefers b. These are (b; b; a, a, b), (b; b; a,
b, a), and (b; b; b, a, a).
When we compute the total expected utility (summed across all
agents), it is 1.75 under the efficient voting rule compared to 1.5 under
the proportional voting rule.
III. The Model
A. Decisions and Agents
A population of agents is divided into m countries. Country i consists
of agents, and this set is denoted by . The total number of agentsn Ci i
in the union is .np  nii
The agents make a decision between two alternatives labeled a and
b. We refer to b as the status quo and a as change.
A state of the world is a description of all agents’ preferences over
the two alternatives. Given that there are only two alternatives, we need
only keep track of the difference in utility that an agent has for alter-
natives a and b. Therefore, without loss of generality we normalize things
so that agent j gets a utility of if a is chosen and a utility of zero if buj
is chosen. So if is positive, then j prefers a.uj
A state of the world is thus a vector , with element beingnu   uj
the difference between agent j’s utilities for a and b. The uncertainty
regarding the state is described by a probability distribution, and all
expectations are taken with respect to that distribution.
B. A Two-Stage Voting Procedure
The decision-making process is described as follows.
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The First Stage
In the first stage, u is realized and each country’s representative decides
whether to vote for a or vote for b. Generally, the representative’s vote
will be related to the preferences of the agents in the representative’s
country.
The representative’s voting behavior is represented by a function
, which maps the state into a vote. The notationnr :  r {a, b} r(u)pi i
indicates that the representative of country i votes for a anda r(u)pi
indicates that the representative votes for b, given the state u. Web
assume that depends only on the preferences of agents within countryri
i.
It is important to emphasize that this formulation allows for many
different ways in which the representative’s vote could depend on the
state of agents’ preferences. It is conceivable that the representative is
an existing politician who polls the population or that the representative
is a dictator, bureaucrat, or other who might decide how to vote quite
differently. Later in the paper we consider the prominent case in which
the representative votes in accordance with a majority of the population.
The Second Stage
In the second stage, the votes of the representatives are aggregated
according to a voting rule.
Let denote the outcome of this two-stage voting1nv :  r {0, , 1}2
procedure as a function of the state. Here is interpreted asv(u)p 1
meaning that alternative a is chosen, means that alternative bv(u)p 0
is chosen, and denotes that a tie has occurred and a coin is1v(u)p 2
flipped.
Feasible voting rules are those that depend only on the information
obtained through the votes of the representatives. The set of all feasible
voting rules thus are those in which implies that′v(u)( v(u ) r(u)(i
for at least one country i.′r(u )i
Given this coding of , the utility of agent j in state u can now bev(u)
written as . Thus the total utility summed across all agents inv(u)# uj
the union is
v(u) u , j
j
and the total expected utility of a union using a voting rule v is
E v(u)u . j[ ]
j
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C. Weighted Voting Rules
An important subclass of feasible voting rules are weighted voting rules.
In such rules, the vote of the representative of country i is given a weight
. The tally of votes for a is the sum of the ’s of the represen-w   wi  i
tatives who cast votes for a, and similarly for b. Alternative a is selected
if its tally of weights exceeds the threshold (denoted ),t  [0,  w ]ii
alternative b is selected if the tally of weights for a is less than the
threshold, and ties are broken by the flip of a fair coin.
D. Equivalent Voting Rules
When one is considering weighted voting rules, different weights and
thresholds can lead to the same voting rule, and so weighted voting
rules are defined only up to an equivalence class.9 Instead of defining
two different pairs of weights and thresholds to be equivalent if their
induced voting rules always make the same choices, we need a coarser
requirement for our main results because tie breaking is not completely
tied down under efficient voting rules.
We say that a profile of voting weights and a threshold (w, t) with
induced weighted voting rule v is equivalent up to ties to a profile of voting
weights and a threshold with induced weighted voting rule if′ ′ ′(w , t ) v
for all u such that .1′ ′v(u)p v (u) v (u)( 2
This is not quite an equivalence relationship, since it allows v to break
ties differently from .10 To see why we define equivalence only up to′v
ties, consider a simple example. There are two countries, and each
consists of a single agent whose utilities take on values in {1, 1}. Let
be (1, 1) and the threshold be 1. Note that the induced voting rule′w
would be efficient for this example. When things are unanimous,′v
picks the unanimous choice; but when and have opposite signs,′v u u1 2
the rule flips a coin and so . Alternative weights1′v (u)p wp (1 e,2
with a threshold of would also be efficient but would favor1) 1 (e/2)
the first agent in the case of a tie. Thus the induced voting rule v would
be more resolute than but would make the same choices in any case′v
in which efficiency was at stake.
9 Equivalent voting rules can be rescalings of each other but also might not be. For
instance, with three countries, with a threshold of 3.5 is equivalent towp (3, 2, 2)
with a threshold of 1.5: they both select the alternative that at least two′w p (1, 1, 1)
countries voted for.
10 This is an asymmetric relationship: v can be equivalent up to ties with whereas the′v
reverse might not hold.
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IV. Efficient Voting Rules
Consider the problem maximizing the expected sum of the utilities of
all agents in the union. The optimum would be to choose a when
and b when . This optimum will generally not be re- u 1 0  u ! 0j jj j
alized, since we lose information in a two-stage procedure. In the second
stage we see only the votes of the representatives, which include only
indirect information about the preferences of the agents.
Efficient voting rules.—While we cannot always maximize the realized
sum of utilities, we can still ask which voting rule maximizes the expected
total utility. An efficient voting rule v is one that has a maximal value
of
E v(u)u j[ ]
j
across all feasible voting rules.
A. A Full Characterization of Efficient Voting Rules
Efficient voting rules work as follows. For each country assign two
weights: one for a votes and one for b votes.11 Country i ’s weight for a
votes is
aw p E u Fr(u)p a ,i k i[ ]
kCi
and its weight for b votes is
bw p E u Fr(u)p b .i k i[ ]
kCi
The efficient voting rule is then defined byEv (u)
a b1 if w 1 w i i
i : r (u)pa i : r (u)pbi i
E a bv (u)p 0 if w ! w i i
i : r (u)pa i : r (u)pbi i
1{ a bif w p w . i i2 i : r (u)pa i : r (u)pbi i
Theorem 1. If preferences are independent across countries, then
a voting rule is efficient if and only if it is equivalent up to ties to .Ev
11 This is a feasible voting rule but not a weighted voting rule.
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The proof appears in the Appendix.
The intuition behind the theorem is straightforward. Conditional on
a vote of , is the estimate of the totalar(u)p a w p E[ u Fr(u)p a]i i k ikCi
utility support for a in country i. By weighting a country’s votes in
proportion to these expectations, the voting rule chooses the alternative
that will result in the highest total utility based on what can be inferred
from the votes of the representatives.
To get a feeling for how such rules work, consider an example with
three countries, where but . Herea b a b a b1p w p w p w p w p w w 1 21 1 2 2 3 3
all votes are equally informative, except when country 3 votes for b,
which indicates stronger support for b.12 In this case, the efficient rule
is to choose b whenever country 3 votes for b and otherwise to operate
under majority rule.13 Note that this rule cannot be represented as an
ordinary weighted voting rule in which each country is just given some
weight and there is some threshold needed for change. There is an
asymmetry between how country 3’s vote for b is treated compared to
all other votes.
Before we turn to the application to the European Union, let us
discuss a few of the implications of the formula. The assumption of the
independence of voters’ preferences across countries is restrictive and
is important to the conclusions of the theorem. Without this assumption,
the estimation of one country’s utility for a given alternative would
depend on the full profile of votes of all countries. In that case an
optimal voting rule would no longer be a weighted rule, but a rule that
was a much more complex mapping between vectors of votes and de-
cisions, since each country’s vote would convey information about the
preferences of all countries’ electorates.
B. Bias and Weighted Voting Rules
In many contexts, there might be some asymmetry in agents’ preferences
over alternatives.
We say that country i is biased with bias ifg 1 0i
E u Fr(u)p b pg E u Fr(u)p a . k i i k i[ ] [ ]
kC kCi i
A country’s bias captures the difference in expectations concerning how
much the country’s voters prefer a over b when their representative
12 This could be due to asymmetries in intensities of preferences within country 3 or
could be due to the correlation structure of preferences within country 3.
13 This is reminiscent of features such as in the U.N. Security Council voting rule, where
core countries hold a veto.
weights of nations 327
votes for a, compared to our expectations about how much the country’s
voters prefer b over a when their representative votes for b.
In cases in which there is a common bias factor g across countries,
theorem 1 has the following corollary. In that case, , and theb aw p gwi i
efficient voting rule can be written as a weighted voting rule.
Corollary 1. If preferences are independent across countries and
each country has the same bias factor g, then a voting rule is efficient
if and only if it is equivalent up to ties to a weighted voting rule with
weights,
w*p E u Fr(u)p ai k i[ ]
kCi
and a threshold of .(g w*)/(g 1)ii
A prominent case of interest is one in which countries are unbiased
( ). Then a voting rule is efficient if and only if it is equivalent upgp 1
to ties to the weights given above and the 50 percent threshold ofw*i
.( w*)/2ii
We make several remarks about corollary 1.
The threshold depends on the bias g, whereas the weights are de-
termined by the expectations that come from each country. Thus one
can judge whether a voting rule’s weights are optimal independently of
the threshold, and vice versa.
The extent to which a country’s representative’s vote is tied to the
utilities of the agents in the country has important consequences. For
example, a large country with a representative who is a dictator whose
vote is uncorrelated with his population’s preferences receives a smaller
weight than a smaller country with a representative whose vote is very
responsive to his population’s preferences. More generally, the larger
support (in net utility) for an alternative that one infers on the basis
of a representative’s vote for that alternative, the larger the weight that
a country receives.
The weights are affected by the distribution of opinions inside a coun-
try. For instance, if a country’s agents had perfectly correlated opinions
(and the representative voted in accordance with them), then a vote
for an alternative would indicate a strong surplus of utility in favor of
that alternative. The more independent the population’s opinions, the
lower the expected surplus of utility in any given situation. Thus higher
correlation among agents’ utilities will generally lead to higher weights.
The efficient weights take into account the intensity of preferences.
So, relatively larger utilities lead to relatively larger weights. Thus a
country that cares more intensely about issues is weighted more heavily
than a country that cares less, all else held equal. Owing to practical
and philosophical difficulties with the appraisals of utilities, one might
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want to be agnostic on this dimension and just treat all ’s equally inuj
the sense of assigning them only values of plus one or minus one. We
do this in the following section.
The following example illustrates the relation between bias and the
voting threshold, as well as the separability of weights and thresholds.
Example 2. Bias and Thresholds
Consider three countries. Countries 1 and 2 have one voter each.
Country 3 has voters.n 3
Voters’ preferences are biased, with bias factor g. All voters are equally
likely to prefer a or b and have ’s take on values of either one or guj
with equal probability. Thus, when a voter prefers b, he or she cares
more intensely than when he or she prefers a, by a factor g. Country
3’s voters have perfectly correlated preferences so that either they all
prefer a or they all prefer b. So country 3 is just a scaled-up version of
countries 1 and 2.
Theorem 1 tells us that the vector of voting weights should be (1, 1,
n3), and the voting threshold should be a fraction of of theg/(g 1)
total weight. As g becomes large, unanimity for a is required to overturn
the status quo b. If , then the threshold is 50 percent of thegp 1
weighted votes.
As we vary and g, the efficient voting rule takes some interestingn 3
forms. For instance, suppose that . Then country 3 has threen p 33
times as many voters and is relatively favored in terms of weights. How-
ever, 3’s “power” still depends on the voting threshold. If , thengp 1
the threshold is 50 percent of the weighted votes; then country 3 is the
only country that has a nontrivial vote and dictates the choice. However,
if , then the threshold is two-thirds of the voting weights. Then agp 2
passes if and only if country 3 and at least one of 1 or 2 votes for a.
Either 3 or 1 and 2 together can block a and keep the status quo.
This example shows the separability of how the weights and thresholds
are determined. The weights depend on the relative utilities (and thus
populations) represented by each of the countries, whereas the thresh-
old depends on the underlying preference structure in terms of a bias
for change versus the status quo. It also shows that the overall voting
rule can still depend in subtle ways on both the threshold and weights.
V. A Block Model
In order to apply the theory and calculate weights as a function of a
country’s population, we now introduce a model that is more specific
about the distribution of agents’ preferences and how representatives
vote. We call this stylized model the “block model,” and it works as
follows.
First, we treat agents’ utilities equally, in the sense that we only account
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for them as plus one or minus one and disregard personal intensities.
This may be defended on grounds of practicality, but also more phil-
osophically as an equal-treatment condition. We also examine a case in
which each agent has an equal probability of supporting either
alternative.
Second, we assume that representatives vote for the alternative that
has majority support in their country, flipping a fair coin when indif-
ferent.
Third, the utilities of agents are distributed as follows. Each country
is made up of some number of blocks of agents, where agents within
each block have perfectly correlated preferences and preferences across
blocks are independent. The blocks within a country are of equal size.
These assumptions reflect the fact that countries are often made up
of some variety of constituencies, within which agents tend to have
correlated preferences. For instance, the farmers in a country might
have similar opinions on a wide variety of issues, as will union members,
intellectuals, and so forth. The block model is a stylized but useful way
to introduce correlation among voters’ preferences, and simple varia-
tions of it provide interesting and pointed specifications of optimal
voting rules.
A. Efficient Weights in the Block Model
Let be the number of blocks in country i. Letting be the size ofN pi i
each block, we obtain the following expression for the efficient weight
of country i:
N !iNiw p p 2 (2x N ) . (1)i i i x!(N  x)!1x N /2i i
There are two prominent variations on the block model that we focus
on in what follows. We call the first variation the fixed-size-block model. In
this variation, blocks have a fixed size across all countries. In this case,
a country’s population can be measured in blocks, and a larger country
has more blocks than a smaller one. Here the ’s are the same acrosspi
all countries.
We call the second variation the fixed-number-of-blocks model. In this
variation, all countries have the same number of blocks, and the size
of the blocks in a given country adjusts according the country’s popu-
lation size. Here the ’s are the same across all countries.Ni
We obtain the following expressions for the efficient weights in the
two specializations of the block model.
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Fig. 1
B. Efficient Weights in the Fixed-Size-Block Model
Given that the population size of a block ( ) is the same across allpi
countries, they can be canceled out, and the weights in the fixed-size-
block-model reduce to
N !iFS Niw p 2 (2x N ) . (2)i i x!(N  x)!1x N /2i i
These weights are graphed in figure 1 as a function of the number of
blocks in the country.14
For large numbers of blocks, the weights vary with the square root
of the number of blocks, which is consistent with weights originally
proposed by Penrose (1946); for small numbers of blocks the weights
diverge from this.
14 Note that the weights are the same for one and two blocks, three and four blocks,
etc. This is reflective of the expression in (2).
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C. Efficient Weights in the Fixed-Number-of-Blocks Model
In the fixed-number-of-blocks model, as the number of blocks ( ) isNi
the same in all countries, the difference in the weights then comes only
in how many agents are represented in a block. The weights are equiv-
alently directly proportional to the population size of the countries:
FNw p p . (3)i i
D. Asymmetries and Nonmonotonicities in Expected Utilities
Our perspective has been to maximize the sum of expected utilities,
which is quite different from trying to equalize expected utilities across
agents. We now illustrate this difference explicitly in the context of the
block models. Efficient rules necessarily treat agents asymmetrically, de-
pending on the size of the country they live in. In the following prop-
osition, we compare the expected utilities of agents living in two coun-
tries of different population size, under the efficient voting rule in the
two variations of the block model.
Proposition 1. In the fixed-number-of-blocks model, agents living
in a larger country have expected utilities that are at least as large as
those of agents living in a smaller country; and whenever the two coun-
tries’ weights are not equivalent,15 the agents in the larger country have
a strictly higher expected utility. In the fixed-size-block model, the ex-
pected utilities of agents across countries can be ordered in either di-
rection relative to the ordering of the countries’ population sizes.
The proof of the proposition is straightforward. We offer a simple
argument for the fixed-number-of-blocks model and an example show-
ing the ambiguity for the fixed-size-block model. In the fixed-number-
of-blocks model, any agent’s block in any country has exactly the same
probability of agreeing with the agent’s representative’s vote. Thus the
expected utilities of agents in different countries differ only to the extent
that their representatives receive different weights. As larger countries
have larger weights, the claim in the proposition follows directly.16
To see the ambiguity in the fixed-size-block model, consider a union
15 Two countries’ weights are equivalent if there exists a set of weights that lead in an
equivalent voting rule in which the two countries’ weights are identical.
16 As pointed out by a referee, in the extreme case in which countries are actually formed
as fairly homogeneous entities (as suggested, e.g., by Alesina and Spolaore [1997]), we
would be in a situation in which each country was a single block. This would convey the
maximal information possible from a representative’s vote, and the overall voting rule
would end up being completely efficient.
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TABLE 1
Nonmonotonicities in Expected Utilities
Populations of
Countries in
Blocks
Efficient Voting
Weights
Expected Utility of an
Agent in
Country 1 or 2 Country 3
(1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1) .25 .25
(1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 1.5) ∼ (1, 1, 1) .25 .125
(1, 1, 5) (1, 1, 1.875) ∼ (1, 1, 1) .25 .09375
(1, 1, 7) (1, 1, 2.186) ∼ (0, 0, 1) 0 .15625
(2, 2, 7) (1, 1, 2.186) ∼ (0, 0, 1) 0 .15625
(3, 3, 7) (1.5, 1.5, 2.186) ∼ (1, 1 ,1) .125 .078125
of three countries. Table 1 shows the expected utilities of the agents as
we vary the number of blocks in the various countries.17
The changes in voting weights result in nonmonotonicities in ex-
pected utilities in several ways. In the cases of (1, 1, 3) and (1, 1, 5),
an agent in country 1 or 2 has a higher utility than an agent in country
3. However, once country 3 hits a population of seven, its weight is such
that the votes from countries 1 and 2 are irrelevant. Thus an agent
would rather be in the larger country when the configuration is (1, 1,
7), and an agent would prefer to be in a smaller country when the
configuration is (1, 1, 3) or (1, 1, 5). Also, as we increase country 3’s
population from three to five, its agents’ utilities fall; but then increasing
the population from five to seven leads to an increase in its agents’
utilities. This contrasts with decreases in utilities of agents in the other
countries.
This example shows that there are no regularities concerning agents’
utilities in the fixed-size-block model. The difficulty is that changes in
population can dilute a given agent’s impact within a country but can
also lead to a relative increase of that country’s voting weight. As these
two factors move against each other, changes can lead to varying effects.
Another question is, how does the total expected utility vary under
efficient voting rules as we change the division of a given population
into different districts or countries? This issue is also generally ambig-
uous, regardless of which version of the block model one considers. For
instance, one might conjecture that if we start with one division of a
17 If an agent prefers a, then he or she gets a payoff of one when his or her preferred
outcome is chosen and zero otherwise. If an agent prefers b, then he or she gets a
payoff of zero when b is chosen and minus one if a is chosen. Then, e.g., for an agent
in country 1 in the (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 3), and (1, 1, 5) cases, there is a three-fourths chance
that at least one of the other countries will prefer the agent’s preferred alternative and
a one-fourth chance that the other two countries will both favor the other alternative.
So, in the one-half probability case in which the agent prefers a, his or her expected
utility is , and in the one-half probability case in which the agent prefers b,3 1(1) (0)4 4
it is . Overall this sums to .25. The calculations in each other case are3 1(0) (1)4 4
similarly direct.
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population into districts and then further subdivide the population into
finer districts, we would enhance efficiency since agents would become
closer to their representatives. However, this is not always the case. To
see this, note that with a union of just one district or country, we es-
sentially have direct democracy. This is the most efficient case possible.
But then dividing this into several districts or countries would lead to
a lower total expected utility under the efficient rule than having just
one district. Now, if we continue to further subdivide the districts, we
eventually reach a point at which each agent resides in a district of one,
which brings us back to direct democracy and full efficiency! Generally,
subdivisions lead to conflicting changes: on the one hand, having a
smaller number of agents within a district gives them a better say in the
determination of their representative’s vote; on the other hand, their
representative is now just one among many. This leads to nonmono-
tonicities and ambiguities of the types discussed above.18
VI. The European Union
We now examine the voting rules of the Council of Ministers of the
European Union under the Nice Treaty and under the draft of the
Constitution produced by the Constitutional Convention in June 2003
(Article 24). Given the stylized nature of the block model and the fact
that the overall decision-making process of the European Union goes
far beyond votes by the Council of Ministers, this is more of an ex-
ploratory exercise than a hard commentary on the E.U. voting process.
This is also not a positive exercise, but rather a normative one. Our
analysis provides a normative description of how voting systems should
be designed. In examining the various proposals for E.U. weights, we
are not presuming that they are optimal systems. Instead, we discuss
which variation of the block model would justify a given proposal.
The voting rule for the European Council of Ministers under the Nice
Treaty is weighted voting. At least 255 of the 345 weighted votes (73.9
percent) must be cast in approval of a proposal for it to pass.19 The
18 This leads to a basic trade-off in structuring an indirect democracy. There are trade-
offs between the cost of involving more voters and having more precise representation.
There has been little exploration of such trade-offs, either theoretically or empirically,
and they might help explain why one sees attempts at more centralization in some cases
(e.g., the European Union) and yet more decentralization within some states.
19 There are two other qualifications as well: (i) that the votes represent at least 14 of
the 27 countries and (ii) that the votes represent at least 62 percent of the total population.
Calculations by Bra¨uninger and Ko¨nig (2001) suggest that there are relatively few scenarios
in which the weighted vote threshold of 255 votes would be met but one of the other two
criteria would fail. It appears that the only impact will arise from the population threshold
and that this will involve only a few configurations of votes providing a very slight boost
in power to Germany and a slight decrease in power to Malta. Thus, for practical purposes,
these additional considerations are relatively unimportant, and the voting weights them-
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relative voting weights appear in figure 2. We also examine the efficient
voting under the two block models. The efficient weights in the fixed-
size-block model are calculated for a block size of 1 million. So, for
instance, Germany has 83 blocks, France has 59, Italy has 58, and so
forth. This leads to efficient voting weights of 7.3, 6.2, and 6.1, respec-
tively, for these countries. The efficient weights in the fixed-number-of-
blocks model are simply proportional to population. These also directly
correspond to those proposed under the Constitution. In order to make
comparisons, we rescale the weights so that they sum to one.
The relationship between the four different weighted voting rules is
pictured in figure 2.
A regression of the Nice Treaty weights on the efficient weights under
the fixed-size-block model provides an of 96 percent for the case of2R
blocks of 1 million (and 95 percent for the case of blocks of 2 million,
with F-statistics in each case over 600). As a comparison, the fit using
weights proportional to population is only 81 percent (with an F-statistic
of 102), and so the efficient weights under the fixed-size-block model
provide a much closer match to the Nice Treaty weights. The reverse
is true for the proposed voting rule in the Constitution, with weights
that are proportional to population. That rule would not be very efficient
if the world were well approximated by the fixed-size-block model, but
would be a perfect fit under the fixed-number-of-blocks model.
Thus we are left with an empirical issue. If the world is a good match
to the fixed-size-block model, then the Nice Treaty weights are (ap-
proximately) efficient; if the world is a good match to the fixed-number-
of-blocks model, then the new Constitution’s weights are efficient. Of
course, these are highly stylized models, and it is likely that the world
does not conform to either. While it seems clear that countries such as
Luxembourg and Malta consist of more than one block, it also seems
clear that the smallest countries have fewer voting blocks than the largest
ones. This suggests that the weights should be nonlinear, although per-
haps not quite to the level suggested by the fixed-size-block model. A
detailed empirical investigation of voting patterns within the countries
of the European Union is beyond the scope of this article.20
Let us also comment briefly on the voting thresholds. The threshold
under the Nice Treaty is 73.9 percent of the total weight, which would
be efficient if countries had a bias of roughly . This indicates agp 3
strong bias for the status quo. In contrast, the threshold of 65 percent
under the Constitution would be efficient if countries had a bias of
selves are the main component of the voting procedure. There are discrepancies in the
Nice Treaty in that some statements imply a threshold of 258 votes and others a threshold
of 255 votes. It appears that the correct number is 255.
20 See Barbera` and Jackson (2004b) for a preliminary analysis of estimated optimal voting
weights based on poll data from the Eurobarometer (2003a, 2003b).
Fig. 2
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roughly . This is also a bias for the status quo, but a less pro-gp 1.86
nounced one.
VII. Concluding Remarks
We have provided a framework for designing and analyzing efficient
voting rules in the context of indirect democracy. We have shown that
the model can be applied to analyzing voting rules such as those of the
European Union and that the relative merits of different rules reduce
to readily identifiable hypotheses that are amenable to empirical testing.
A careful analysis of the E.U. voting rules will require richer data and
application of our results beyond the case of the block model. Never-
theless, our theoretical results provide a framework with intuitive char-
acterizations of optimal voting rules that appears to lend itself well to
such an exercise.
There are other considerations that should be explored in further
studies. In decision making, it may be that countries can sometimes
include side payments or logroll so that multiple decisions can be made
at once. These possibilities can further enhance the efficiency of the
decision making and might influence the structure of the voting system
that is to be used.21 One can also consider a voting system’s stability. As
the rules can be amended, considerations other than efficiency enter
the long-run picture, since only certain rules will survive.22 Another is
the issue of fairness or equality. As we have shown, efficient weights do
not necessarily lead to the same expected utilities for agents in different
countries. For instance, proposition 1 showed that larger countries are
favored under proportional weights in the fixed-number-of-blocks
model. There are other issues that can be considered, such as votes over
more than two alternatives, private information, agenda formation, and
risk aversion, to highlight a few of the more obvious ones.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
An efficient voting rule is a feasible voting rule that maximizes
E v(u)u . k[ ]
k
21 See, e.g., Harstad (2004, 2005), who considers side payments and the ability to invest
in projects; Casella (2005), who considers rules specifically designed for votes over se-
quences of decisions; and Jackson and Sonnenschein (forthcoming), who show that ap-
proximate efficiency can be obtained if multiple decisions can be bundled and voted over
in a linked manner.
22 See Barbera` and Jackson (2004a) and Sosnowska (2002) for an examination of the
stability of voting rules.
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Let be an event in which the realization of rep-(r (u), … , r (u)p r , … , r )1 m 1 m
resentatives (i.e., votes of the countries) is . Under feasibility,m(r , … , r ) {a, b}1 m
we can then write as a function of instead of u. Hence, the totalv(u) (r , … , r )1 m
expected utility is written as
E v(r , … , r )u Fr (u), … , r (u)p r , … , r  1 m k 1 m 1 m[ ]
r ,…,r k1 m
# P(r (u), … , r (u)p r , … , r ).1 m 1 m
Given the independence across countries, we can write this as
v(r , … , r ) E u Fr(u)p r P(r (u), … , r (u)p r , … , r ).  1 m k i i 1 m 1 m{ [ ]}
r ,…,r i kC1 m i
It then follows that if we can find a voting rule that maximizes
v(r , … , r ) E u Fr (A1) 1 m k i[ ]
i kCi
pointwise for each , then it must be efficient. Moreover, if we find(r , … , r )1 m
one that leads to a zero whenever there is indifference between a and b, then
all efficient voting rules must be equivalent to it up to ties.
Note that for any given , maximizing expression (A1) requires(r , … , r )1 m
setting whenv(r , … , r )p 11 m
E u Fr 1 0 (A2)  k i[ ]
i kCi
and whenv(r , … , r )p 01 m
E u Fr ! 0 (A3)  k i[ ]
i kCi
and does not have any requirement when this expression is equal to zero.
Given the definitions of and , we can then rewrite (A2) and (A3) asa bw wi i
whenv(r , … , r )p 11 m
a bw  w 1 0 (A4) i i
i : rpa i : rpbi i
and whenv(r , … , r )p 01 m
a bw  w ! 0. (A5) i i
i : rpa i : rpbi i
This is as defined in , where we flip a coin in the case of a tie. Any efficientEv
voting rule must agree with this one except in the case in which this rule results
in an expression equal to zero. This concludes the proof of the theorem. QED
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